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Thirteen Ways of Looking at
Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned
by Paul Lombardo’s Three Generations,
No Imbeciles
Michelle Oberman

Introduction
Paul Lombardo’s recent book, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme
Court and Buck v. Bell,1 chronicles the history of state-sponsored sterilization over
the course of the 20th century. As a historical endeavor, it is rich and rewarding,
permitting the reader a broad understanding of the social, cultural and legal
context for the case that inspired Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous quotation,
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”2 Lombardo’s work masterfully
ties the eugenics movement of the early 20th century to the broader policies
informing the government’s role in regulating reproduction.
Equally important as the excavation of this history is the manner in which
Lombardo’s writing surfaces the emotional consequences of fertility-related
policies. The grace of Lombardo’s work lies in his unwavering focus on the
individuals whose lives were altered by their inability to have children. The
result is a book that is far more than a story about a long-gone era. It is also
a book laden with open questions and challenges for contemporary policyMichelle Oberman is Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. With apologies
and gratitude for the inspiration provided me by Wallace Stevens’ poem, Thirteen Ways of
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collections, including Wallace Stevens: Collected Poetry and Prose (Library of America 1977) at
74. Profound thanks are owed to Lorraine Sachiko (Santa Clara Law School Class of 2008), for
helping me transform a very rough draft into an article I could actually write, and to Jean Love,
Pat Cain, and Dean Donald Polden at Santa Clara University School of Law for unflagging
support. Special thanks also to Molly Selvin for providing superlative editorial assistance. This
essay is dedicated to Paul Lombardo, who embodies the perfect balance of passion and dispassion
needed to produce enduring and meaningful contributions to our collective understanding of the
law and of what we aspire to call civilization.
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Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and
Buck v. Bell (The John Hopkins University Press 2008).

2.

Buck v. Bell, Superintendent, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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makers. For instance, what is the significance of reproduction to the individual,
and what role should the state play in response to its citizens’ reproductive
capacities and desires?
Lombardo’s book, which I originally picked up solely because of my interest
in eugenics in the U.S., is so thought-provoking that the academic in me could
not help but envision it as an ideal foundation for a semester-long class, with
a week devoted to each of a number of themes expressly or inherently raised
by the text. I took the bait, and have organized this essay into thirteen themes
that struck me as particularly noteworthy and deserving of exploration. Of
course, the book’s value extends far beyond the academy, and I don’t mean
this organizational device to suggest that this book is intended primarily
for classroom use. On the contrary, it is accessible to lay and professional
audiences alike. Indeed, it is so smoothly written that one hardly notices how
much one is learning while turning the pages.
Like Lombardo’s book, this essay is neither fish nor fowl—it is neither a
book review nor is it a course proposal. Although I have used Lombardo’s
book twice now as the central text for a semester-long seminar entitled
“Government Regulation of Reproduction,” this essay is less a syllabus than an
exploration of the tangents that seem to emanate from Lombardo’s historical
tale. The themes upon which Lombardo touches may be grouped into three
general categories: the state role in regulating fertility; gender, race, and class
issues in fertility regulation; and contemporary reproduction-related politics
as they pertain to human attributes. In the pages that follow, I describe each
of these general categories, and present a taste of the various issues, themes, or
meditations suggested by Lombardo’s project.
I. The State and Fertility Regulation
In retrospect, the core story of Buck v. Bell is the hubris with which the
government of the state of Virginia, with the imprimatur of the United States
Supreme Court, assumed the authority to strip certain classes of human beings
of their capacity to bear children. Lombardo’s early chapters tell this story
in vivid detail, taking the reader well beyond the familiar words of Holmes’
proclamation to explore the manner in which citizens gradually ceded such
authority to the state. In the end, though, Lombardo’s story reveals that it
was no anonymous “state” that sterilized Carrie Buck and others. Instead,
sterilization laws were the progeny of a cadre of earnest, self-righteous,
misguided, and occasionally delusional individuals.
A. Theme One: The History of Eugenics
Any effort to understand the laws that permitted state governments to
sterilize their citizens is helped by a thorough discussion of the history of
eugenics. Chapters 1 through 6 of Lombardo’s book provide an excellent
description of the early 20th century eugenics movement, bringing the most
prominent advocates of this philosophy to life in vivid detail.
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Carrie Buck’s sterilization was just one by-product of decades of work by a
small group of intellectuals and advocates who were deeply engaged in what
they viewed as an effort to improve the human species, or at least those who
lived in the United States. Lombardo’s study reveals them to be individuals
who saw themselves as leaders of their generation, whose eugenics-based
activism was imbued with their conviction that they had a deep responsibility
to protect and promote the future of civilization.
There never was a broad consensus in favor of eugenic policies, nor were
sterilization laws passed on a whim. Instead, in state after state, there was a
surprisingly robust debate about when and whether the state should invoke
the authority to sterilize a certain class of citizens.3 Sterilization laws, when
they passed, were not reflections of a unanimous desire of the people to purge
the nation of those it deemed unworthy. Instead, they were the product of
persistent lobbying by a committed group of individuals.
The bulk of Lombardo’s history focuses on Virginia, the state that enacted
the law that authorized Carrie Buck’s sterilization. The Virginia law was the
culmination of decades of work by several proponents of eugenics. Each had
championed eugenics individually before their paths crossed.
Heredity studies in the U.S. began in the late 19th century, triggered by the
discovery of genes.4 In classic scientific tradition, work began by classifying
what could be observed about genes in the hope that eventually scientists
would come to understand the link between genes and human traits. In 1910,
a private office, the Eugenics Research Office (ERO), was established in New
York. Run by Harry Laughlin, a former teacher from Missouri, it was richly
endowed by America’s leading corporate giants, including the Carnegie
Foundation, John D. Rockefeller, and railroad magnate E.H. Harriman.5 The
lack of scientific proof linking liking genes to expressed human traits failed to
forestall the ERO’s move from descriptive “pedigree studies” to proclamations
in favor of sterilization as a solution to the strain on society presented by
“defective and delinquent classes of the community.”6
Although eugenic sterilization always had its detractors, the crusade for
sterilization took hold in numerous states.7 Among these advocates was Dr.
Albert Priddy, the superintendent of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics
and the Feebleminded. As early as 1911, Dr. Priddy began calling for legalized
eugenics. In support of his campaign for sterilizing inmates whom he deemed
3.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 20ff (Chapter 2) (chronicling the movements for and opposition
to early, pre-Buck eugenics laws, including laws in PA, MA, MI, IN, WA, NJ). See also id. at
53 (presenting legal critiques of Laughlin’s Model Law, which was the foundation for the VA
law).

4.

Id. at 30 (describing the influence of Mendelian theory on early eugenicists).

5.

Id. at 31–32.

6.

Id. at 36, 47.

7.

See id. at 24–29 (chronicling states with laws promoting sterilization). See also id. at 58 (noting
the American Bar Association’s condemnation of the practice).
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“immoral,” “overly fond of men,” or those with “a reputation for promiscuity,”
he conducted extensive research among inmates in his facility, and traveled to
states with more liberal policies.8 Eventually, Priddy began sterilizing women
inmates in the Virginia State Colony under his own interpretation of a 1916
Virginia law that allowed surgery designed to benefit the “physical, mental or
moral” condition of inmates.9
Over time, Dr. Priddy’s overreaching brought him trouble. Along with a
state probation officer, Priddy focused on the Mallory family, a poor family
with many children and a history of struggling with work, alcoholism, and
domestic violence.10 Priddy arranged to have the mother and two daughters,
ages fifteen and thirteen, committed to the Virginia Colony on the grounds
of hereditary mental deficiency.11 It took several weeks for Mr. Mallory to
learn what had happened. Then he and his family immediately began to
petition for their release. Mrs. Mallory was sterilized by the time Mr. Mallory
secured a lawyer and sued Dr. Priddy and the Virginia Colony.12 The lawsuit,
which voided the detention of the Mallory girls and justified Mrs. Mallory’s
sterilization only on the grounds of a “medical emergency,” rather than on the
broader eugenic grounds invoked by the defense, convinced Priddy of the
need for clearer legal mandates in order to proceed with his plan for eugenic
sterilization.13
In reworking Virginia law to permit eugenic sterilization, Dr. Priddy found
an ally in the idealistic eugenics proponent, Harry Laughlin, who had drafted
“A Model Sterilization Law” in 1914.14 By 1920, Laughlin was regarded as an
international expert in eugenic sterilization.15 Two years later, he published
his “Eugenical Sterilization in the United States,” which contained his Model
Law.16 In 1921, Priddy joined forces with Aubrey Strode, the attorney for the
State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded, who worked with him to
lobby for the law’s passage in the Virginia General Assembly.17 The Virginia
Sterilization Act of 1924 was drafted by Aubrey Strode; parts of it copied
almost verbatim parts of Laughlin’s Model Act.18
8.

Id. at 61.

9.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 60.

10.

Id. at 65.

11.

Id. at 67.

12.

Id. at 68.

13.

Id. at 77.

14.

Id. at 51.

15.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 78.

16.

Id. at 85.

17.

Id. at 100.

18.

Id. at 99–100.
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The Virginia Sterilization Act of 1924 illustrates the twin rationales eugenics
advocates, such as Priddy, Strode, and Laughlin, promoted in support of
eugenic policies. First, they asserted that sterilization was truly humane for the
individual concerned. Second, they convinced others that the welfare of their
community, their state, and indeed the country would be enhanced if specific
classes of individuals did not bear children. The Act’s “procedural safeguards,”
mandatory after the Mallory case, provided that if a superintendent of a state
hospital or the State Colony for Epileptics and the Feebleminded is “of the
opinion that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society” to sterilize
an inmate, he may do so as long as he complies with the Act’s requirements.19
These requirements included petitioning the given institution’s board of
directors, serving the inmate’s legal guardian with the petition, and convening
a special board to hear the petition and other allowed forms of legal evidence,
including the inmate’s commitment papers and depositions. At the special
board, all parties were entitled to legal counsel. The superintendent or the
inmate could appeal the special board decision to the circuit court, then to the
Supreme Court of Appeals. The Act also provided that “neither any of said
superintendents nor any other person legally participating in the execution of
the provisions of this act shall be liable either civilly or criminally on account
of said participation.” Here was the protection against litigation Priddy had
sought after his loss in the Mallory case.
The world Lombardo describes in this part of his history was in many ways
smaller than our own. In the end, its intimacy enabled sterilization proponents
to orchestrate the passage of Virginia’s law and to ensure it would withstand
legal challenge. The interconnected nature of the community of advocates of
state-sponsored sterilization included Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, author
of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Buck v. Bell. As Lombardo
points out in his first chapter, Justice Holmes’ father, the famous poet and
essayist, wrote an extended essay about heredity, “moral idiocy,” and the
“deep-rooted moral defects” criminals passed to their offspring.20 Justice
Holmes echoed his father’s beliefs when writing the opinion for Buck v. Bell.
B. Theme Two: A Serious Re-Reading of Buck v. Bell
Many have excoriated Buck v. Bell, counting it among the most notorious
United States Supreme Court decisions of the 20th century.21 It is easy to see
why it should be regarded as such, given the false factual premises of the
ostensibly scientific record upon which it was predicated. As Lombardo’s title
concludes, even under prevailing medical standards of the 1920s, Carrie Buck,
19.

Id. at 288ff.

20.

Id. at 9.

21.

See, e.g., Ana Romero-Bosch, Lessons in Legal History—Eugenics and Genetics, 11 Mich. St.
J. Med. & L. 89, 96 (2007) (discussing the “infamous” case of Buck v. Bell); Sonia M.
Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 897, 909–14 (2007)
(criticizing the “shoddiness” of Buck v. Bell).
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her mother, and her daughter were not “imbeciles.” Instead, they were poor
women who were vulnerable to coercion and abuse at the hands of others,
including the state.
To dismiss the opinion outright is too easy, though. Instead, it is worth
probing the extent to which Holmes’ sense of the relationship between the
individual and the state has any lingering validity. Holmes’ opinion rests upon
two policy-based arguments. First, he concludes that some individuals are so
ill-suited for parenthood that they should not be permitted to become parents.
He predicates this determination on the grounds that their offspring are
destined to become burdens on the state.22 Second, he argues that, because the
state may require soldiers to sacrifice their lives on its behalf, it must a fortiori be
permitted to require lesser sacrifices, including sterilization, of others.23
Both of these arguments merit consideration prior to dismissal. The first is
easy to fault on grounds of ambiguity. Precisely which individuals are to be
considered ill-suited for parenthood? And even if it were possible to identify a
class of individuals incapable of rearing children, what is the metric by which
the state is to judge the extent to which their offspring are likely to become
burdens? Holmes’ opinion rests heavily on now-discredited faith in genetic
inheritance, and the assumption that a relatively unintelligent mother will
produce a relatively unintelligent child.
One can ridicule Holmes’ misplaced faith in eugenics, and yet, one also can
find vestiges of it in contemporary social policies pertaining to reproduction.
Virginia’s sterilization law was neither the first nor the last attempt by a
government to influence its citizens’ child-bearing decisions.24 Sterilization
is the most extreme of such policies, to be sure, and Lombardo provides a
detailed account of the contemporaneous laws in other states and nations that
advanced government-supported or government-mandated sterilization.25 But
there are myriad less overt examples of government policies that attempt to
encourage or discourage reproduction. Sometimes these policies are indirect,
as in tax deductions or child allowances, which might encourage reproduction,
or welfare policies that might discourage childbearing by capping the amount
of state support for poor women.26 Some policies are less subtle in their intent.
22.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.

23.

Id.

24.

See discussion infra Part III.1.

25.

See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note 1, at 20 (regarding medical experimentation on men and
women in institutions); id. at 239–40 (regarding experimental sterilization programs in the
U.S.); id. at 248 (regarding the “massive sterilization” of Native Americans at Indian Health
Services facilities throughout the U.S.). A more detailed discussion of these policies is found
below. See infra section II, C Race & Eugenics.

26.

Id. at 275 (providing the example of a proposed 2007 New Mexico bill requiring mothers
of any baby born with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) to receive contraceptive injections. If
such a mother has a second child with FAS, the bill proposed court ordered sterilization). See
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Consider, for instance, premarital testing laws and policies, which often are
designed to discourage reproduction by those whose offspring might bear a
disproportionately high risk of abnormality.27
Buck v. Bell’s second assertion—that a government claiming the right to
conscript soldiers into mortal combat surely has the right to demand lesser
sacrifices from its citizens—is not as readily dismissed. Holmes surely is right
in noting the hypocrisy of claiming a government has no right to demand
non-life-threatening or “lesser” physical sacrifices from its citizens, while at
the same time maintaining a mandatory draft. Living in an era of voluntary
conscription, we might ignore his challenge. The fact of the matter is that we
live today with this hypocrisy.
For example, in the name of public health, the government is empowered
to and in fact does make demands of citizens.28 State governments typically
require children to receive certain vaccinations prior to matriculation into
public schools.29 Some states have implemented policies collecting corneas
from cadavers—a policy designed to enhance the supply of corneas available
for transplantation, a procedure routinely required by a significant percentage
also id. at 242 (describing a 1956 bill proposed in Virginia, which would have allowed public
welfare officials to initiate sterilization proceedings against women who had given birth to
more than one illegitimate child).
27.

Id. at 46 (noting that laws requiring testing for syphilis or other conditions that affected
fertility were routinely labeled “eugenic marriage laws”). See generally Michael Closen, Robert
Gamrath, & Dem Hopkins, Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing: Political Exploitation of
the AIDS Epidemic, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 71 (1994), for a discussion of “mandatory premarital
HIV testing” statutes, including the Illinois and Louisiana statutes that were passed and
later repealed in the late 1980s. These statutes were illogical as public health measures, being
predicated upon false assumptions—e.g. that couples do not engage in premarital sexual
contact, and that, once married, couples remain monogamous. See generally Lainie Friedman
Ross, Heterozygote Carrier Testing in High Schools Abroad: What are the Lessons for the
U.S.?, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 753 (2006), for a discussion of voluntary prenatal carrier testing,
such as Tay-Sachs Disease screening, which is offered to prevent births of children with fatal
genetic abnormalities.

28.

The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reserved “police powers” related to health,
safety, and welfare to the states.

29.

All states have laws conditioning school enrollment upon vaccinations, however states vary
slightly on which vaccinations are required and on the exceptions to these laws. See, e.g., James
G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and
Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 869–73 (2002) (delineating all state school vaccination laws
as of 2002 and noting, for example, that some states require mumps vaccinations while some
do not). Nearly all states allow religious or “philosophical” exemptions to mandatory state
school vaccination laws, though such exemptions are controversial and often challenged.
See generally Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to StateCompelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1101
(2005). Every state except Mississippi and West Virginia offers religious exemptions, but
only twenty states offer philosophical exemptions. See The National Conference of State
Legislatures’ chart of “States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School
Immunization Requirements” (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/
SchoolExempLawsChart.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
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of the population.30 Even though the extractions involve cadavers rather
than living citizens, the cornea extraction laws and their “presumed consent”
provisions have seen their fair share of controversy.31
In spite of the broad public health powers given to states by the U.S.
Constitution,32 proposals to curtail individual rights in the name of protecting
the general welfare remain relatively rare and are met with great resistance. For
instance, proposals to increase the organ supply by creating a presumption
in favor of donation with opportunities to opt out, as opposed to the present
policy, which requires solicitation of next of kin, have been universally
rejected.33 Nor has there been any significant support for creating mandatory
universal bone marrow typing programs, although it is clear that bone marrow
donations can save lives, that they are relatively harmless to the donor, and
that the only barrier to saving more lives is the limited number of “matching”
donors currently registered as volunteers.34
30.

According to the Eye Bank Association of America, “[c]orneal transplant is one of the most
frequently performed human transplant procedures. Since 1961, more than 549,889 corneal
transplants have been performed, restoring sight to men, women, and children ranging in
age from nine days to 103 years.” Eye Bank Association of America’s “Frequently Asked
Questions,” available at http://www.restoresight.org/general/faqs.htm#5 (last visited Mar. 3,
2009). See Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts, 2006 U. Chi.
Legal F. 317, 330, n.48 (2006), for a list of states that have passed cornea extraction laws.

31.

See Goodwin, supra note 30, at 331, n.50 (citing S. Gregory Boyd, Comment, Considering
a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 417, 441 (2003) (discussing a Florida
court’s characterization of corneal removal as a small intrusion) and Marie-Andree Jacob,
On Silencing and Slicing: Presumed Consent to Post-Mortem Organ “Donation” in
Diversified Societies, 11 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 239, 254–55 (2003) (describing the criticism
that presumed consent is unethical)).

32.

As Professors Lawrence Gostin and James Hodge note, citing Professor Judith Areen, “In
the realm of public health, the Constitution acts as both a fountain and a levee. It originates
the flow of power to preserve the public health and it curbs that power to protect individual
freedoms.” Lawrence O. Gostin & James Hodge, Jr., The Public Health Improvement
Process in Alaska: Toward a Model Public Health Law, 17 Alaska L. Rev. 77, 85, n.21 (2000).

33.

Note that in many European countries, an individual is presumed an organ donor unless he/
she expressly declares otherwise; as a result, 90 percent of people in these countries are organ
donors. See Jane E. Brody, The Solvable Problem of Organ Shortages, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/health/28brod.html (last visited Dec.
10, 2009). Proposals for a similar organ donation scheme in the U.S. are strongly disfavored,
as Americans view organ donation as a deeply personal choice. See, e.g., Scott Carney, The
Case for Mandatory Organ Donation, Wired Magazine, May 8, 2007, http://www.wired.
com/medtech/health/news/2007/05/india_transplants_donorpolicy (last visited Mar. 3,
2009) (describing the mandatory organ donation plan proposed by two U.S. medical school
professors).

34.

In the legal and ethical debates regarding bone marrow donation, proponents for mandatory
bone marrow registries and mandatory bone marrow donation have not prevailed because
“no value is more thoroughly entrenched in American culture than is the notion of privacy”;
individual privacy rights are eroded if the government decides when one person’s tissue
should be invaded or “harvested” for the benefit of another. Rhonda G. Hartman, The
Privacy Implications of Professor Anderson’s Proposed Mandatory Registry for Bone
Marrow Donation: A Reply, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 531, 531, 548–50.
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From a public health perspective, Holmes’ opinion is well-grounded in
federal and state constitutional law. And yet, the reality seems to be that the
government today makes relatively minor express demands of its citizens’
bodies, virtually always providing an opportunity for them to object and
exempt themselves. For instance, the extent to which suggestions that it was
time to re-impose a universal draft, triggered by the unpopular U.S. war in
Iraq, were met with scorn, silence, and eye-rolling.35 As Lombardo discusses
in his epilogue, one further legacy of Buck v. Bell is to force us to question the
extent to which we actually are willing to empower our government to pursue
communitarian goals when they conflict with individual liberty.36
C. Theme Three: Lawyers Behaving Badly
Lombardo’s book reveals a treasure trove of professionalism questions for
lawyers. To begin with, he unveils significant chumminess, if not outright
collusion, among the professionals involved in the case. The “teamwork” started
before Carrie Buck was identified as a potential candidate for sterilization, but
nowhere was it more troubling than in the manner in which the lawyers for the
state, the defense, and the judges worked together to insure the law would be
upheld and Carrie would be sterilized. In Chapters 8 through 12, Lombardo
chronicles the depth and extent of the collaboration between the key players
behind Buck v. Bell.
As Lombardo states in his Introduction, the Buck case was not just a tragedy,
it was “a legal sham.”37 Lombardo’s research revealed that lawyers orchestrated
the case for the state-operated Virginia Colony for Epileptics and Carrie Buck’s
court-appointed attorney, Whitehead. The case began when Aubrey Strode,
an attorney and the author of the Virginia sterilization statute, approached
the Colony. Strode urged its head doctor, Dr. Albert Priddy, to choose a
patient who would have standing to “oppose” the law. Dr. Priddy chose Carrie
Buck. The Colony then chose and hired Carrie’s attorney, Whitehead, who
Lombardo reveals to be the “confidant of Priddy, boyhood friend of Aubrey
Strode, former Colony director, and [a] sterilization advocate.”38 Indeed, the
Colony had a building named after Mr. Whitehead.39 Whitehead was less than
35.

For example, U.S. military and national security experts recommended that President Bush
alter his goals to fit the military resources of the current volunteer army, rather than reinstate
a universal draft. Fred Kaplan, The Army, Faced with its Limits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2006.
Also, in the second year of the Iraq War, the U.S. House of Representatives voted against
the Universal National Service Act of 2003, which proposed “that all young persons in the
United States, including women, perform a period of military service or a period of civilian
service in furtherance of the national defense and homeland security….” Universal National
Service Act of 2003, H.R. 163, 108th Cong. (2004).

36.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 274.

37.

Id. at xi.

38.

Id. at 107.

39.

Id. at 133.
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a zealous advocate for Carrie at the trial, which lasted only five hours,40 and
when the case went before the United States Supreme Court, his arguments
were “sketchy at best.”41 Not only was he on the opposing party’s payroll,
Whitehead also attended Colony board meetings to discuss the trial court
decision and to remind the Colony that the case would likely progress to the
United States Supreme Court.42 In Chapter 10, Lombardo discusses evidence
that was readily available and could have been used in Carrie Buck’s defense.
These included experts, literature, studies, and individual examinations of
Carrie and her daughter. Instead, her attorney insured his client lost her case.
Whitehead’s “grossly negligent”43 performance led many to observe it was as if
Priddy had two attorneys and Carrie had none.44
The story of this collaboration raises important issues for scholars and
teachers of professional responsibility, calling attention to its hazards in
cause-based lawyering, as well as to the consequences of the test-case model
of jurisprudence in the wake of a “successful” test. The morally and legally
abhorrent behavior documented in Lombardo’s history helps set a baseline
against which one might readily consider more ambiguous documentation
of the “casualties” of cause lawyering.45 For example, Kevin McMunigal’s
thought-provoking essay contrasting lawyer Sarah Weddington’s view of Roe v.
Wade with Norma McCorvey (Jane Roe’s) experience of the abortion litigation
raises similar issues about the extent to which a lawyer can effectively represent
both her client and a political cause.46 These risks are enhanced to the extent
40.

Id. at 135.

41.

Id. at 157–58.

42.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 150.

43.

Id. at 154.

44.

Id. at 127.

45.

See generally Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments
and Professional Responsibilities (Oxford University Press 1998) (exploring the ethical
dimensions of lawyers who choose clients and tailor cases to pursue the lawyers’ own
respective agendas). See Susan D. Carle, Symposium, How Should We Theorize Class
Interests in Thinking about Professional Regulation?: The Early NAACP as a Case
Example, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 571, 571–84 (2003), for a rich discussion of how early
NAACP “test cases” were contrary to established rules of legal ethics. As with the attorneys
on both sides of Carrie Buck’s case, the NAACP “actively created litigation where none
would have existed otherwise” and “solicited” plaintiffs in order to create the litigation.
Both tactics violated rules of legal ethics at the time. Most notably, the early NAACP test
case attorneys were white “elitists” who purported to litigate in the best interests of African
Americans, but who in fact promoted the interests of their own class.

46.

Kevin C. McMunigal, Essay, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47 Hastings
L.J. 779, 784 (1996) (explaining that in spite of her professional obligations to place her
client’s needs ahead of any other goals, Weddington consistently maintains she brought
the Roe case on behalf of “women such as the abortion project volunteers” and women in
general).
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that the client is relatively disenfranchised, whether for reasons of class, race,
gender, or lack of education. All of these factors played into both Carrie Buck’s
and Norma McCorvey’s experiences with the legal system.47
As a cautionary tale for test-case methodology, Buck v. Bell also provides an
excellent example of the manner in which, once upheld by a court, a law may
quickly be applied in situations well beyond those contemplated by the initial
case. In this instance, after “cooking” the evidence to suggest that sterilization
was justified because Carrie Buck was one of three generations of women whose
low intelligence rendered them incompetent as mothers, the state of Virginia
(among others) was permitted broad sway in implementing its new law. The
result was an expansion of the categories of those considered appropriate
candidates for sterilization to the point where the law moved beyond its
moorings in eugenics to embrace the sterilization of “moral degenerates” and
criminals.
D. Theme Four: Doctors as Agents of the State, Then and Now
The story of state-sponsored sterilization also may be seen as an example
of doctors sacrificing their professional integrity by forming alliances with
the state. Obviously, the sterilization laws could not have been implemented
without doctors willing to work with the state to purge the population of
the threat it saw in the reproductive capacity of a subset of its population. A
student of health law, and in particular of public health law, should have little
trouble seeing eugenics programs as familiar when considered in the context
of other instances of moral panic. In the name of promoting the best interests
of their patients and their country, health care professionals have participated
in dubious medical endeavors throughout history and today—torture and
medical experiments carried out upon uninformed or non-consenting
individuals, testing pregnant women for evidence of substance abuse without
first obtaining informed consent, and participating in executions, just to
mention a few.48
47.

Id. at 786–90.

48.

An example of doctors participating in non-consensual, racially discriminatory drug tests
of predominately poor, black women just after they gave birth occurred at the Medical
University of South Carolina. See Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in
America’s Drug War: Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria Over Crack,
54 Ala. L. Rev. 665, 684–90 (2003) (discussing the “crack baby” myth perpetuated by the
media in the 1980s, which gave rise to prenatal and postnatal drug testing for mothers and
infants, such as that by the Medical University of South Carolina). See generally Donald P.
Judges, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Capital Punishment: An Exercise in
Moral Disengagement, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 515 (2004), for a discussion of doctors participating
in capital punishment executions. A contemporary example of doctors participating in
government-sponsored torture is the U.S. military prison Abu Ghraib. See Jennifer E. Lloyd,
Note, Primum non nocere: Singleton v. Norris and the Ethical Dilemma of Medicating the
Condemned, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 225, 247–48 (2005) (describing Abu Ghraib as a place in which,
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Lombardo surfaces this theme via a succinct, yet powerful discussion of
the Nazi medical experiments that took place in World War II concentration
camps, set alongside the U.S. history of non-consensual medical experiments
performed on patients in state institutions and asylums.49 Other examples of
doctors compromising their ethical obligations to their patients in the name
of carrying out state policy abound. One particularly relevant contemporary
analogy to the role of doctors in state-sponsored sterilization campaigns is
the manner in which state and federal governments have attempted to enlist
doctors in the “fight” against illegal immigration. In a recent article, Professor
Brietta Clark documents the various efforts to require emergency room doctors
and other hospital personnel to determine their patients’ immigration status.50
E. Theme Five: Public Choice Theory and Eugenics Laws
Lombardo’s history of Buck v. Bell and the American foray into eugenics
provides an excellent illustration of public choice theory at work at the
intersection of public policy, private health, and the law. Public choice theory
emerged in the 1950s, in an effort to apply the tools of microeconomics to
the analysis of governmental actions.51 Generally speaking, public choice
theorists demonstrate the manner in which self-interest can lead to distortions
in the political process. This happens when a coalition seeking some specific
advantage devotes their resources to rally the state into action, and succeeds
because their concentrated interests are more readily perceived by legislators
than are the diffuse opposing interests of the general citizenry.
Lombardo’s account demonstrates the ongoing presence of opponents
to eugenics throughout the decades in question. In Chapter 4, Lombardo
recounts the doctors, geneticists, committees, and lawmakers whose
outspoken and robust opposition to eugenics yielded successful campaigns
against sterilization laws. For example, critics of Harry Laughlin decried his
research with the Eugenics Records Office as anecdotal at best.52 The lack of
concrete data on the “therapeutic benefit” to those targeted by sterilization
“U.S. military doctors grossly violated medical ethics by participating in acts in violation
of international treaties on human rights.” She cites Robert Jay Lifton, a Harvard Medical
School psychiatrist and author of a book on Nazi doctors, who described the prison as a
situation in which “doctors and other medical personnel were part of a command structure
that permitted, encouraged, and sometimes orchestrated torture to a degree that it became
the norm—with which they were expected to comply.”).
49.

See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note 1, at 20 (discussing Nazi medical experiments); Id. at 239–40
(discussing medical experiments in U.S. institutions and asylums).

50.

Brietta R. Clark, The Immigrant Health Care Narrative and What it Tells Us About the
U.S. Healthcare System, 17 Annals Health L. 229, 237 (2008) (providing the example that
in 2005, President Bush proposed a policy that would have required hospital personnel to
check the immigration status of patients and report to the federal government (citing Robert
Pear, Payments to Help Hospitals Care for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. Times, May 10, 2005.)).

51.

Paul Starr, Essay, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 6, 6–41 (1988), and
the sources for his footnotes 27–36, provide a rich overview to this topic.

52.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 53–54.
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laws was a major stumbling block for eugenics advocates.53 Where successful,
campaigns against eugenics laws in various states blocked proposed legislation
by showing sterilization was being employed as unconstitutional punishment,
rather than as therapy for a patient’s benefit.54 Controversy over sterilization
prompted the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (AICLC)
to form a committee to analyze proposed laws for sterilizing criminals.55 The
committee’s 1916 report was harshly critical of the anecdotal research relied
upon by the eugenics movement.56 Laughlin, however, remained undeterred
by the growing number of eugenics detractors.57
The success Harry Laughlin and others achieved in Virginia provides a
classic example of how a small number of deeply committed individuals can
shift public policy to their desired end, provided the opposition is generalized
and sufficiently diffuse that it can be outlasted or worn down.58 By the time
Virginia passed its law, at least eleven other states had considered and rejected
or repealed similar laws.59 Of course, it is also possible that the relative
success of pro-eugenic forces is attributable to issues of gender, race, class,
and disability. Opponents of sterilization laws might have been less likely to
protest given the identity of those targeted by the laws—poor residents of state
facilities for the mentally disabled.
F. Theme Six: Comparative Law, Population Policies, and Eugenics
Chapters 15 and 17 of Lombardo’s book establish the ties between U.S.
proponents of eugenics policies and their German counterparts. The
first of these chapters describes the evolution of eugenics in Germany as a
public health measure.60 It also illustrates the manner in which intellectual
collaboration led to surprisingly similar policy formulation in the early decades
of the 20th century in both the U.S. and Germany.61 In Chapter 17, Lombardo
discusses the demise of the popular embrace of eugenics occasioned by the
Nuremberg trials and the exposure of broad-scaled sterilization campaigns
carried out by the Nazis against Jews and other sub-populations they deemed
53.

Id. at 54.

54.

Id. at 54–55.

55.

Id. at 54.

56.

Id. at 55.

57.

Id. at 56.

58.

Supra Theme One: The History of Eugenics, and accompanying footnotes.

59.

See Lombardo, supra note 1, at 91.

60.

Id. at 199.

61.

Id.
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“defective.”62 Interestingly, Nazi defense lawyers invoked the precedent of
Buck v. Bell and legalized sterilization as an example of “race protection laws of
other countries.”63
The exposure and public condemnation of Nazi sterilization practices did
not lead the U.S. Supreme Court, or state courts or legislatures for that matter,
to reconsider their stance in favor of sterilization of the “feebleminded.”64
Instead, the surgeries continued, but at a slower pace, and according to
Lombardo, public consciousness and concern over the composition of the
U.S. population moved from sterilization to policies governing out-of-wedlock
births and mixed-race marriages.65
Lombardo moves on to tell the story of Buck v. Bell’s rediscovery in the late
1970s and early 1980s, and of the effort made by ACLU lawyers to obtain legal
redress for those who had been victims of non-consensual sterilization.66 This
story provides a necessary denouement for the central topic of his book—the
story of Carrie Buck and the law. It is by no means the end of the story of
government efforts to regulate the reproduction of its citizenry. Instead, it
serves as an excellent jumping off point for those interested in exploring both
past and present population policies around the world.
In my Spring 2009 seminar, entitled “Government Regulation of
Reproduction,” we used Lombardo’s chapters on German policy to launch
a discussion of the perceived “population explosion” that motivated policies
such as India’s “Sterilization Emergency” in the late 1970s, and that continues
to animate China’s one-child policy.67 We discussed the extent to which U.S.
62.

Id. at 236ff.

63.

Id. at 239.

64.

Id. at 241.

65.

Id. at 244–45.

66.

Id. at 250–51 (discussing Poe v. Lynchburg Training School and Hospital, 518 F. Supp. 789
(1981)).

67.

One of the best overviews of this subject is Amartya Sen’s essay, Fertility and Coercion, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1035 (1996); for a brief overview of the China policy, I assigned Matthew D.
Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny Of Eugenics: Autonomy Gone Awol, 15 Cardozo J.
Int’l & Comp. L. 371 (2007). One might also use Nicole Skalla, China’s One-Child Policy:
Illegal Children and the Family Planning Law, 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 329 (2004). Regarding
the Indian Sterilization Emergency, see Geetanjali Misra, Veronica Magar & Susan Legro,
Poor Reproductive Health and Environmental Degradation; Outcomes of Women’s Low
Status in India, 6 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 273, 285–86 (1995) (citations omitted):
In the 1970s, the government of India established mass sterilization camps. They still
exist today, with some of the same abuses and poor conditions: health conditions
are substandard, financial incentives are offered to both sterilization recruiters and
clients, and most villages are obligated to fill sterilization quotas. Seventy percent of
all couples using modern birth control methods rely on sterilization, with the woman
usually being the one who is sterilized. Because vasectomies were the focus of the
greatest coercion in the 1970s, vasectomy rates have dropped. Women now bear the
responsibility of the sterilizations in India, even though the risks are greater for women
than men.
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foreign aid fuels population policies around the world, including those in
Africa, which remains the continent with the world’s highest birth rates. In
addition, we explored endeavors to promote population growth by nations
worried about declining birth rates and the aging of their population. By
situating our discussion in contemporary cultures facing real problems with
poverty, women’s rights, access to care, and inequality, the world of Carrie
Buck suddenly seemed a good deal more familiar and less readily dismissed as
“ancient history” than it had earlier in the term.
II. Gender, Race, Class, Crime, and Fertility Regulation
A second set of themes emerging from Lombardo’s chronicle of Buck v. Bell
and eugenics in the U.S. involves the gender, race, and class of those targeted
by the sterilization laws. Lombardo’s research points to the disproportionate
impact these laws had on those whose social standing rendered them vulnerable.
Typically, they were women, almost always poor women, and quite often also
women of color. Indeed, it is difficult to separate out the strands of gender,
class, race, and crime when considering both the history and contemporary
government efforts to shape reproductive patterns. In this section, I briefly
discuss each of these factors, noting the ways in which membership in each
group, let alone in more than one of these groups, rendered one vulnerable.
Following this, I discuss the manner in which the social vulnerability of those
targeted by sterilization laws permitted the laws to expand beyond their
original moorings in eugenics to embrace a more frankly punitive policy.
A. Theme Seven: Gender and Sterilization Laws
From the perspective of gender, Lombardo’s rendition of Carrie Buck’s
story serves as a particularly vivid reminder of the manner in which doctors
and governments have appropriated women’s bodies, and in particular their
reproductive capacity, in pursuit of purportedly salutary ends. The history
of the medical profession’s disregard of women’s bodily autonomy stretches
back hundreds of years, and persists in a variety of guises even today.68 A
brief list of examples might include the remarkable history of non-consensual
medical experimentation on pregnant women,69 the efforts of psychiatrists to
68.

See Cheryl Meyer, The Wandering Uterus: Politics and the Reproductive Rights of Women
(NYU Press 1997), and Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: Two
Centuries of the Experts’ Advice to Women (Anchor 2005), for two particularly wellresearched and well-written histories of the medical profession’s treatment of women’s
bodies. More contemporary instances include court-ordered cesarean sections, in which the
doctor appoints himself an agent for the fetus, and uses the court’s power to override his
pregnant patient’s autonomy and privacy. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’
Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 451
(2000), for a discussion of the betrayal of fiduciary duty inherent in these cases.

69.

See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp 713 (1978), a class action lawsuit brought
by more than 1,000 women who received diethylstilbestrol (DES) in the 1950s as part of
their prenatal care at the University of Chicago’s teaching hospital. Doctors gave the women
DES as part of a clinical trial sponsored by the manufacturer to determine whether DES
prevented miscarriages. Until almost two decades later, the women did not know that they
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label as mentally ill women who sought to pursue occupations other than as
housewives and mothers,70 and more recent policies focused on the detection
and punishment of women who ingest illicit substances during pregnancy.71
Lombardo’s book enables the reader to situate Carrie Buck’s sterilization
and the eugenics movement of the early 20th century in the broad context of this
history. It was no accident that Carrie, a young woman, was chosen as the test
case for upholding the Virginia law.72 Indeed, it was her gender that brought
her to the state institution in the first place. Prior to her institutionalization in
Virginia’s Colony for Epileptics and the Feebleminded, she had lived with a
foster family. She was placed in foster care when she was approximately three
years old, after her father died and her mother was deemed incapable of caring
for herself and her children.73 As a child, Carrie attended school and seems to
have participated fully and normally in her foster family’s household.
Things changed when Carrie became pregnant after a sexual encounter
with her foster parents’ nephew.74 Although she described this encounter as
non-consensual—a rape—no report was filed with the police. When her foster
parents realized what had happened, they brought her to the state institution
for the feebleminded.75 Her status as an unmarried pregnant teenager, coupled
with their testimony about her behavior, was sufficient evidence to have her
admitted. Their nephew’s reputation was protected. The harm done to Carrie
had been multiplied, but her degradation was not yet complete.
Once she became a resident of the state facility, without a family who might
protest on her behalf and newly delivered of her child, Carrie was identified as
an ideal candidate for the first sterilization under Virginia’s new law. Supporters
of the law knew it would be challenged, and they consciously selected the
first sterilization case with an eye to that challenge. There was little chance
that, in removing Carrie’s capacity for reproduction, the state might trigger
had received DES or that they were part of a clinical trial. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent
and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 Am. J.L. &
Med. 361, 372–73 (2002), for a thoughtful discussion of this case and others like it.
70.

See Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Yellow Wallpaper (Dover Publications 1997) (originally
published in 1892), for a vivid depiction of these policies in practice.

71.

Although no one advocates taking drugs during pregnancy, current medical and legal
literature on the subject exposes as irrational and counterproductive efforts to single out
pregnant women for punishment. See, e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow, Governmental Responses to
Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 DePaul J. Health Care L. 461 (2005);
see also Nancy D. Campbell, Women as Perpetrators of Crime: The Construction of Pregnant
Drug-Using Women as Criminal Perpetrators, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 463 (2006).

72.

See Lombardo, supra note 1, at 63 (describing the overwhelming extent to which the first
“patients” selected for sterilization from the population of state residential facilities were
women).

73.

Id. at 103.

74.

Id. at 140 (discussing Carrie’s description of her rape by her foster parents’ nephew, followed
by his promise to marry her).

75.

Id. at 103.
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the empathy of male judges, lawyers, doctors, policy-makers, or journalists.
It would have taken too great a leap of imagination for those empowered to
determine her fate to see themselves as potential victims of the same policies.76
B. Theme Eight: Class and Eugenics
Of equal importance in rendering Carrie Buck the ideal test case for
Virginia’s sterilization law was the fact that she was poor, and cut off from the
resources that might have enabled her to challenge the state’s actions against
her. As with gender, there is a long history of government-sponsored efforts
to control the reproductive lives of the poor. Those in power tend to perceive
a threat in the capacity of the poor to grow and multiply. Indeed, the Old
Testament’s account of Pharaoh’s order to kill the newborn sons of Hebrew
slaves reflects these fears and might be seen as an early eugenics policy of
sorts.77
In the U.S., anxiety on the part of both the government and private social
service organizations served to fuel eugenics-based policies designed to curb
the number of children born to poor mothers. Some of these efforts were direct,
such as sterilization laws that targeted residents of public institutions. More
often, though, efforts to limit reproduction among the poor were indirect. For
instance, consider the rhetoric employed by Margaret Sanger, the founder
of Planned Parenthood and a tireless campaigner on behalf of legalizing
birth control. Although ultimately it seems she was motivated by the desire
to improve the health of poor women, she often predicated her support for
76.

This point is driven home forcefully by Lombardo’s revelation that Dr. Arthur Estabrook,
the expert whose testimony regarding Carrie Buck’s “moral degeneracy” justified the state’s
decision to sterilize her, had a history of extramarital affairs and financial fraud—conduct
easily exceeding any “moral degeneracy” manifested by Carrie Buck. Id. at 182–84. Even
more ironic and to the point is the fact that Harry Laughlin developed epilepsy, a condition
that would have made him a target for sterilization under the very law he worked to pass. Id.
at 213–14.

77.

The Old Testament Book of Exodus, Chapter 1, verses 8–16, tells the following story:
Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who knew not Joseph. And he said unto his
people: “Behold, the people of the children of Israel are too many and too mighty
for us; come, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass,
that, when there befalleth us any war, they also join themselves unto our enemies, and
fight against us, and get them up out of the land.” Therefore they did set over them
taskmasters to afflict them with their burdens. And they built for Pharaoh store-cities,
Pithom and Raamses. But the more they afflicted them, the more they multiplied and
the more they spread abroad.…And the king of Egypt spoke to the Hebrew midwives,
of whom the name of the one was Shiphrah, and the name of the other Puah; and he
said: “When ye do the office of a midwife to the Hebrew women, ye shall look upon
the birthstool: if it be a son, then ye shall kill him; but if it be a daughter, then she
shall live.”
Exodus Chapter 1, http://www.mechon-mamre.org/e/et/et0201.htm (last visited 2/25/2009).
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legalizing contraception upon her fears of the consequences of “unchecked
breeding” among poor immigrants to the U.S.78 For instance, one of her early
pamphlets read:
It is a vicious cycle; ignorance breeds poverty and poverty breeds ignorance.
There is only one cure for both, and that is to stop breeding these things.
Stop bringing to birth children whose inheritance cannot be one of health
or intelligence. Stop bringing into the world children whose parents cannot
provide for them.79

A less direct application of eugenics-based thinking to the poor may be
observed in contemporary policies such as those governing health care finance
for recipients of public assistance. Consider, for example, the implications of
Medicaid support for sterilization, but not for other forms of reproductive
healthcare, such as treating infertility. The latter is a significant problem
among poor Americans of color, who suffer disproportionately from infertility
secondary to sexually transmitted diseases.80 According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention:
While representing 12 percent of the U.S. population, blacks had about 70
percent of reported gonorrhea cases and almost half of all chlamydia and
syphilis cases (48 percent and 46 percent, respectively) in 2007. STDs take
an especially heavy toll on black women, 15 to 19 years of age, who account
for the highest rates of both chlamydia (9,646.7 per 100,000 population) and
gonorrhea (2,955.7 per 100,000 population) of any group. STDs in this age
group are of particular concern because of the potential threat of these two
diseases to a woman’s fertility.81

Although Medicaid programs cover treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases, the Centers for Disease Control notes that outreach programs
focusing on education, prevention and early detection are necessary to combat
the spread of these diseases.82 The appalling racial disparities in STD rates, and
78.

In a 1932 article Sanger advocated: “A stern and rigid policy of sterilization and segregation
to that grade of population whose progeny is already tainted or whose inheritance is such
that objectionable traits may be transmitted to offspring.” Margaret Sanger, A Plan for
Peace, Birth Control Review, Apr. 1932, at 106.

79.

Margaret Sanger, What Every Boy and Girl Should Know 140 (United Sales Co. 1915).

80.

Although there is not yet a consensus on why poor American youth of color suffer
disproportionately high rates of sexually transmitted diseases, the link between diseases
such as chlamydia and subsequent infertility is undisputed. See Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Jan. 2009, http://cme.medscape.com/viewarticle/586754 (last visited Mar.
4, 2009).

81.

http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/PressRelease011309.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2009).

82.

Id. (quoting John M. Douglas, Jr., M.D., director of CDC’s Division of STD Prevention,
“We must intensify efforts to reach these communities with needed screening and treatment
services. Testing and the knowledge of infection is a critical first step toward reducing the
continued consequences of these diseases.”).
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the heightened risk of infertility inherent in these numbers, suggest an urgent
need for policy interventions in order to protect poor women of color from
infertility. Indeed, were the government truly concerned about the implications
of these disparities, one would expect it to promote access to all manner of
treatments associated with preserving and promoting this population’s ability
to bear children. Nonetheless, suggestions that government-sponsored health
care plans for the poor should include treatment for infertility have been
greeted by derision even from well-known liberal legislators such as the late
Senator Edward Kennedy.83 Given the acknowledged barriers to health care
experienced by poor Americans, in conjunction with the refusal to consider
funding infertility treatments, one might wonder whether there is an implicit
eugenic policy in the failure to devise health care interventions to encourage
the early detection and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.
C. Theme Nine: Race and Eugenics
Although Carrie Buck was a poor white woman, the eugenics movement
that ensnared her was, in reality, disproportionally concerned with regulating
the reproductive lives of women of color. Because the bulk of his book is
devoted to telling Carrie’s story, Lombardo only occasionally notes the
deep racism that infected, and many argue continues to affect, government
reproduction-related policies.84 This is not to say that Lombardo views the
racist implications of eugenics policy as a thing exclusively of the past. Indeed,
toward the end of the book, Lombardo provides a telling reminder that “the
class-based, racist eugenics of previous generations is not dead.”85 Lombardo
recounts the 2004 congressional election in Tennessee, in which James Hart
ran on a eugenic platform, advocating for a “war on poverty genes,” namely
those of the “African race.”86

83.

For example, when Massachusetts paid for fertility drugs given to Medicaid patients on
welfare, many of whom already had children, Senator Kennedy responded with “Our goal
in using tax dollars wisely is to reduce welfare dependency, not create more of it.” Ellen
Goodman, A Short Supply of Common Sense in Government-Funded Conception, The
Boston Globe, March 20, 1994.

84.

Lombardo discusses some proposals for race-based eugenics laws, as well as the discriminatory
implementation of past sterilization laws. See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note 1, at 27 (citing a
California physician whose solution to the “Negro problem” was to enact a eugenics law
similar to a 1911 New Jersey sterilization law); id. at 58 (discussing race as an issue during
eugenics law proposals in 1907 Virginia, where one doctor called for the castration of black
men who assaulted white women); id. at 158 (noting that former President William Howard
Taft, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during Buck v. Bell, rejected the “unsanity of
racial prejudice” that characterized eugenics laws mandating racial separation); id. at 243
(including a section on Loving v. Virginia and how eugenics motives underscored antimiscegenation laws); and id. at 248 (regarding the massive rates of sterilization performed
on Native Americans at Indian Health Services facilities).

85.

Lombardo, supra note 1, at 275.

86.

Id.
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In considering how to explore the racist legacy and ongoing relevance of
eugenics in contemporary policies, one might well turn to the history of U.S.
immigration policy.87 This history is rich material for those either curious
about, or perhaps ignorant of the manner in which the U.S. government
has attempted and still attempts to shape the composition of its population.
Because I covered much of this material in considering contemporary
comparative population policies,88 when teaching my seminar, I elected
to engage in a more straightforward examination of the ways in which race
intersects with eugenics policies, beginning in the early 20th century.
Dorothy Roberts’ 1997 book, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and
the Meaning of Liberty, is one of the richest explorations of the long history of
eugenic and quasi-eugenic policies that have regulated the lives of poor black
women in the U.S.89 In her book, Roberts traces social policies governing the
reproductive lives of black women to the era of slavery. It is almost too painful
to consider the human torment inherent in policies that treated female slaves as
breeders, sanctioning the forcible removal and sale of their offspring, whether
conceived in rape, in forced breeding, or perhaps in love. But those who wish
to understand the hubris of American eugenics cannot afford to ignore this
history, as it is the unvarnished prologue to much of what has followed.
Slavery “marked [b]lack women from the beginning as objects whose
decisions about reproduction should be subject to social regulation rather
than to their own will.”90 Roberts argues that one might see later policies,
such as those advanced by the birth control and eugenic movements of the
early 1900s, as direct descendents of slavery’s attitude toward black women.91
Several other scholars advance similar arguments with regard to contemporary
policies governing reproduction, particularly those governing perinatal
substance abuse and access to assisted reproductive technology.92
Native American women likewise fell victim to government policies that
devalued their reproductive autonomy and their offspring. Many accounts
document the genocidal policies of European settlers in North America. From
87.

See, e.g., Charles Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and
Reason, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 755 (2000).

88.

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

89.

Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty
(Vintage 1997).

90.

Id. at 23.

91.

Roberts is cautious in tying early birth control reformers to the strictly racist policies of
early eugenicists. For example, although Roberts criticized Margaret Sanger, the strongest
feminist advocate for birth control in the early part of the 20th century, for her eventual
alliance with certain eugenic interests, she ultimately dismisses the charge that Sanger was a
racist: “It appears that Sanger was motivated by a genuine concern to improve the health of
the poor mothers she served rather than a desire to eliminate their stock.” Id. at 81.

92.

See Michele Goodwin, Issues of Access to Advanced Reproductive Technologies: Prosecuting
the Womb, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1657 (2008), for a particularly thought-provoking and
thorough discussion of the persistence of eugenic policies.
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the time of their earliest contact, Native Americans were relentlessly pursued
and many individuals murdered; entire tribes were forcibly relocated from
their homes and their land was stolen.93 For many years, the federal Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) operated health clinics in which Native American women
were subjected to forced sterilization.94 Accounts of these forced sterilizations
indicate that the women who did consent often did so under duress: they were
provided inaccurate medical information and even threatened with the loss of
health services or welfare benefits.95 Nor were these policies ancient history.
Medical records show that as recently as the 1970s, the BIA-operated Indian
Health Service Hospital in Claremore, Oklahoma was routinely performing
sterilization procedures on Native American women without obtaining a
thorough informed consent.96
Once one situates governmental reproduction-related policies and race in
historical context, the through-line linking these policies to contemporary
efforts to regulate the reproductive lives of women of color is readily apparent.
For instance, consider the manner in which the criminal justice system has
responded to public health problems stemming from perinatal substance
abuse. Long after being discredited on medical and public health grounds,
criminal justice officials have persisted in prosecuting “pregnant addicts,”
focusing on public hospitals used disproportionally by poor women of color
who use street drugs.97 The effort to cast substance abuse by pregnant women
as a crime flies in the face of virtually all contemporary literature by medical
and public health experts, who note, first, that the focus on drugs misses
the equally, if not more menacing, harm posed to fetuses by alcohol and/or
prescription drug abuse, and, further, that the threat of prosecution drives
women away from the health care system, rather than encouraging them to
see it as a resource for securing healthier outcomes for themselves and for their

93.

Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model
to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp.
L. 1017, 1046 (2001).

94.

Id. at 1046 n.208 (citing Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 Duke L.J.
492, 515, n.73 (1993) (noting that 24 percent of all Indian women of childbearing age had
been sterilized by 1976, and Indian Health Services routinely sterilized up to 3,000 Native
American women per year)).

95.

Id. at 1048–49.

96.

Id. at 1049. Note that the sterilization policies were only part of a more extensive eugenic
program in North America. For over a hundred years, the United States and Canadian
governments forcibly abducted Native American children as young as five from their homes
and took them to government-sponsored “Indian schools” where they were “educated” and
“assimilated” into the dominant culture. Id. at 1049–50. See also Keri B. Lazarus, Adoption
of Native American and First Nations Children: Are the United States and Canada
Recognizing the Best Interests of the Children?, 14 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 255, 257 (1997).

97.

See Paltrow, supra note 71, for a discussion of states’ ongoing punitive responses to the use of
drugs and alcohol by pregnant women.

378

Journal of Legal Education

fetuses.98 Criminalization of perinatal substance abuse, according to Professor
Roberts, must be seen as part of a “continuing legacy of the degradation of [b]
lack motherhood.”99
Professor Roberts argues that anxiety about black mothers and their
babies has motivated contemporary policies as diverse as welfare regulations,
the criminalization of substance abuse by pregnant women, and mandatory
sterilization. These policies, Roberts explains, ultimately rest upon and
reinforce “the twin assumptions that the problem of [b]lack poverty can be
cured by lowering [b]lack birthrates and that [b]lack women’s bodies are an
appropriate site for this social experiment.”100 As Roberts explains, prosecution
and criminalization are part of a larger and long-term social tendency to
devalue black mothering. This tendency draws upon and reinforces dominant
ideals of motherhood, which include ideas about who is and who is not fit
to be a mother, and about whose offspring are a social benefit and whose are
not. As we have seen throughout history, such ideals may explicitly or tacitly
inform a host of eugenic policies.
D. Theme Ten: Crime, Reproduction, and Expanding Eugenics to Criminals
As is true with many other things, a little bit of scientific knowledge can cause
a great deal of harm. This truism was borne out as proponents of sterilization
for the “mentally deficient” began to advocate for a more broadly scaled use
of sterilization on behalf of improving the human race. In the spirit of quasiscience that already infused eugenics policies, the years following passage of
the Virginia sterilization statute saw a demand for sterilization that went well
98.

Numerous publications have demonstrated that crack addiction, which triggered the initial
wave of prosecutions of pregnant women, is and remains today both less prevalent and
more racially diverse than portrayed by the media. See, e.g., Laura E. Gomez, Misconceiving
Mothers: Legislators, Prosecutors, and the Politics of Prenatal Drug Exposure (Temple
University Press 1997). Moreover, media reports and policy makers alike ignored the many
other causes of fetal harm, which include alcohol, tobacco, poverty, poor health, domestic
violence, and poor nutrition. In view of these factors, crack cocaine usage certainly is not
the only substance, nor even the primary substance, that poses a threat to fetal wellbeing.
As Roberts suggests in Killing the Black Body, drug addiction often occurs in such a
complex context that it is exceedingly difficult to determine what precisely impairs a fetus:
“Researchers cannot tell us which of this array of hazards actually caused the terrible
outcomes they originally attributed to crack.” Roberts, supra note 89, at 158.

99.

Roberts, supra note 89, at 153–54 (noting that in Charleston, South Carolina alone, “all but
one of four dozen women arrested for prenatal crimes in Charleston were [b]lack”). At the
national level, 70 percent of the 1990 criminal cases involving prenatal drug exposure also
involved black defendants. Id. at 172. And despite a slightly higher rate of drug use rate
among white women, black women are ten times more likely to be reported to authorities.
These statistics can be explained in part by the racial bias of medical professionals. Roberts
quotes one nurse as saying that her solution to the problem of prenatal drug exposure would
be to recommend that “most [b]lack women…have their tubes tied….” Id. at 175.

100. Id. at 149.
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beyond any plausible foundation in genetic inheritance. The most noteworthy
of these policies were laws that permitted states to order sterilization for
“habitual criminals,” whom it deemed to be “morally deficient.”101
Lombardo’s chapter on Skinner v. Oklahoma traces the expansion of sterilization
laws to include those whose repeated encounters with the criminal justice system
rendered them eligible for state-ordered sterilization. After Buck was decided,
six states relied on the opinion to support their own sterilization laws.102 One
of these states was Oklahoma, where the release of certain institutionalized
persons was conditioned upon sterilization.103 Later, Oklahoma extended
the law to prisoners, mandating involuntary sexual sterilization for repeat
offenders.104 Oklahoma’s law singled out “habitual criminals,” defined as “threetime felons.”105 The class-based eugenic foundation for these laws is revealed
when one considers the manner in which substantially similar felons, such as
those convicted of larceny or embezzlement, subject to the same prison term
under Oklahoma law, were not subject to involuntary sterilization.106 Some
have suggested that the only plausible distinction between these categories
of offenses is that the typical theft convict is more likely to be relatively poor,
whereas those convicted of larceny or embezzlement tend to be white collar.107
Mr. Skinner’s first conviction was in 1926, following his arrest for stealing
chicken.108 Over the next 10 years, he committed two additional crimes, both
armed robberies.109 On the strength of this criminal record, the Oklahoma
attorney general moved to have him declared a habitual criminal, and ultimately,
the state Supreme Court ordered him sterilized.110 The U.S. Supreme Court
took certiorari on the case and reversed, arguing principally that the Oklahoma
act was flawed because Skinner had not been afforded the chance to advance
evidence showing that he was not likely to become the “probable potential
parent of socially undesirable offspring.”111
101. Lombardo, supra note 1, at 219.
102. Id.
103. Id. See Victoria F. Nourse, In Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near-Triumph
of American Eugenics (W.W. Norton & Co. 2008), for a refreshingly thorough and readable
history of the Skinner case and its legacy.
104. Lombardo, supra note 1, at 221.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 223–24.
107. See, e.g., Steven M. Recht, Note, “M” is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate Motherhood
Controversy, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 1013, n.108 (1988).
108. Lombardo, supra note 1, at 225.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
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Finding flaws in the Skinner decision is almost as easy as finding flaws in
Buck v. Bell. (Was Skinner really a “habitual criminal”? If so, was there any
reason to believe his criminal behavior derived from his genetic makeup,
and was capable of being transmitted to his offspring?). But despite its
acknowledgement of the statute’s seemingly weak factual foundation, the
Court took issue only with the due process violations imposed on Skinner.
The holding itself is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the Court
believed Skinner should have been permitted to advance evidence showing
he actually had the potential to produce socially desirable offspring (and who
knows what that means or how one would prove it), or whether instead the
court meant only that Skinner should have been permitted to argue that he
did not intend to become a parent. Other parts of the law (for example, the
seemingly arbitrary list of crimes that trigger sterilization), would have been
permitted to stand. In dicta, for instance, the Court noted that it would not
have second-guessed the state’s use of its police power to single out the thief
while protecting the embezzler.112
More interesting, though, is the morphing of eugenics from its original
anchor in a mistaken understanding of genetic inheritance to a policy of
state-based reproductive control unrelated to genetics. Although it struck
the underlying law, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Skinner foreshadowed a
host of later criminal justice policies devaluing the reproductive capacity of
felons. Consider, for example, the numerous cases conditioning probation
or lenient sentencing upon the convict’s consent to use contraception or to
be sterilized.113 Sometimes judges suggest sterilization or contraception as a
condition of probation for those convicted of crimes involving harming their
own children. Although controversial because such conditions surely are not
the least restrictive means of protecting an as-yet-to-be conceived child, one
112. The Court in Skinner noted that Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act allowed
for sterilization of a criminal for larceny but not for embezzlement, though the crimes are
almost identical under Oklahoma law and only differentiated for sterilization purposes.
Id. at 542–43. The Court went on to say, “…if we had here only a question as to a State’s
classification of crimes, such as embezzlement or larceny, no substantial federal question
would be raised.” Id. at 540. The classist bias built into this law is explicit: common thieves,
who are more likely to be poor than embezzlers, should not be permitted to propagate.
113.

See, e.g., Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 725–26 (Cal. 1998)
(describing the facts of the unpublished case, People v. Johnson, in which the judge ordered
that the defendant submit to a Norplant birth-control implant as a condition of probation
citing People v. Johnson, No. F015316, 1992 WL 685375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)). See generally
Janet F. Ginzberg, Note, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of Probation: the Use
and Abuse of Norplant, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 979 (1992), for a discussion of cases in which
women defendants were ordered to avoid pregnancy, either via mandated birth control or
behavior control, as part of the term of their probations. For an example of sterilization in lieu
of prison time, see Rachel Roth, “No New Babies?”: Gender Inequality and Reproductive
Control in the Criminal Justice and Prison Systems, 12 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 391,
407 (2004) (discussing Melody Baldwin, who in 1988 pleaded guilty to child neglect after
facing a murder charge in the death of her four-year-old son. She was pregnant when she
appeared before the judge. She complied with his “suggestion” to undergo sterilization after
giving birth, and the judge sentenced her to ten years out of a possible twenty in prison).
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can at least follow the line of reasoning that leads the judge to propose such
a condition.114 Other times, however, the court’s effort to curb reproduction
among those whom they convict is utterly disconnected from the crime for
which they have been convicted. For example, Lombardo includes the example
of judges who offer men who have fallen seriously behind on child support
payments the option of going to jail or having a vasectomy.115
III. The Regulation of Reproduction, or Eugenics in the 21st Century116
As discussed throughout this essay, governmental regulation of
reproduction can be accomplished directly or indirectly, via economic policies
as well as by civil regulation and criminal laws. In this final section, I consider
three manifestations of contemporary “eugenic” policies not necessarily
touched upon in Lombardo’s history, but plainly growing out of the rich
foundation his work has laid: the contemporary market in human gametes,
the development and incorporation of prenatal testing into standard prenatal
care, and the regulation of sex and reproduction among developmentally
disabled individuals.

114. Rory Riley, Note: A Punishment that Does Not Fit the Crime: The Use of Judge-Ordered
Sterilization as a Condition of Probation, 20 Quin Prob. L. J. 72 (2006).
115.

See e.g. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). See also Lombardo, supra note 1, at 276;
see Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (noting that Skinner was to be sterilized for theft); see also Angela
Hooton, Symposium, Celebrating Twenty Years of Feminist Pedagogy, Praxis, and Prisms:
A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing Mainstream and Latina
Feminism, 13 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 59, 71 (2005) (“In California, some judges
ordered female defendants to undergo sterilization as a condition of probation. In one
particularly notorious case, a twenty-one year old Latina was given the choice between
jail time or probation conditional upon her sterilization. The crime, a misdemeanor, was
being present in a room where her boyfriend was caught smoking marijuana. In addition
to probation sentences, some women were coercively sterilized in order to obtain welfare
benefits.”).

116. In recent decades, the word “eugenics” has come to have specific resonance with antiabortion advocates. There is much to be said about the extent to which such an analogy
is apt or inapt. In a newer essay, Lombardo probes this question. See Paul A. Lombardo,
Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 57 (2008).

382

Journal of Legal Education

A. Theme Eleven: Eugenics and the Market in Human Gametes117
The infertility industry has given rise to a thriving international market in
the sale of gametes—human eggs and sperm. This market proliferates, to a great
extent heedless of state and national efforts at regulation and standardization,
owing largely to deep-seated beliefs regarding the significance of genetic
endowment.118
The first artificial insemination dates back to 1790 in Scotland; the first
reported artificial insemination in the U.S. occurred in 1884.119 American
doctors began using artificial insemination with donor sperm in the 1950s
to help married couples in which the husband’s sperm count was too low to
permit conception.120 Originally, the focus on genetics tended to be limited to
a concern with matching the donor’s physical characteristics to those of the
infertile husband—height, hair color, eye color, and ethnicity.121
At first blush, the desire to produce a child who will resemble his nonbiological parent seems uncontroversial and almost innate. Parents often look
for signs of themselves in their children; indeed some sociobiologists contend
117.

One might easily expand this topic to include a discussion of the class-based, de-facto
eugenics inherent in permitting free-market approaches to govern access and regulation
of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). At first blush, it seems that the challenge
of paying for various forms of ARTs is no different from other market challenges facing
those with limited resources. The eugenic side of this issue emerges when one considers the
disparate impact of governmental non-regulation on two populations: gays and lesbians, and
the poor. By definition, gays and lesbians need some intervention in order to have children.
Many states do not permit same-sex couples to adopt or refuse to acknowledge adoptions
permitted under the laws of other states. See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?:
Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (2008), for a
breakdown of which states permit same-sex adoptions and which do not, and the Full Faith
and Credit issues that arise when same-sex couples with adopted children travel interstate.
Gays and lesbians would seem to be particularly likely consumers of assisted reproductive
technologies, and yet, discrimination by private doctors may dissuade many from obtaining
the assistance they need. Although she ultimately was victorious in court, the story of
Guadalupe Benitez is illustrative of this point. See North Coast Women’s Care Medical
Group, Inc v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (upholding a lesbian patient’s claim
that her doctors violated state anti-discrimination laws by refusing to perform intrauterine
insemination). The disparate impact of high-cost ARTs on the poor is self-evident, and
yet, even their usual allies in Congress laugh at the thought that Medicaid might have an
obligation to assist poor Americans in their desire to have genetically-linked offspring.
See supra note 83 (regarding Senator Edward Kennedy’s response to the proposition that
Massachusetts should pay for fertility drugs given to Medicaid patients on welfare).

118. See generally Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free Trade in Human Reproductive Cells: A Solution to
Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15 Minn. J. Int’l L. 263 (2006).
119. The Assisted Reproductive Technology Timeline, available at http://www.artparenting.org/
about/index.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
120. See Ann Lamport, Note, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial Insemination, and
In Vitro Fertilization, 4 Am. J.L. & Med. 109 (1988); see also Kathleen M. Thies & John F.
Travers, Growth and Development Through the Lifespan 37 (Jones & Bartlett Publishers
2004).
121. See Lamport, supra note 120, at 117.
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that the impulse to reproduce derives at least in part from our yearning
toward self-replication.122 Of course, it is impossible to guarantee whether
any given sperm from a donor will in fact carry the specific traits desired by
the recipient.123 Nonetheless, from the start, doctors and recipient families
considered it desirable and sound practice to seek out sperm donors using
assumptions about genetic inheritance.
It was a small leap from the practice of choosing physically similar sperm
donors to buying oocytes (human eggs) from young women with high SAT
scores and specific talents, attributes, and accolades (e.g., athletic scholarships,
musical talent, ethnic identity).124 College newspapers across the U.S. routinely
run advertisements from infertile couples seeking oocytes from particularly
gifted female students in the hopes that their genes will optimize their chances
of producing a similarly gifted child.125 In spite of efforts by national regulatory
organizations to cap payments, it is clear that the market grades oocytes
according to the perceived value of the genes they bear.

122. See, e.g., Richard M. Lerner, Concepts and Theories of Human Development 317 (Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates 2002) (stating that a purpose of human reproduction is to provide a
means by which genes replicate themselves).
123. See generally Michael Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics
Past—Present, and Future?, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 125 (2003) at notes 426–431 (discussing
limitations on the current technological capacity to predict outcomes in prenatal genetic
diagnostic techniques, along with the eugenic potential inherent in emerging technologies).
124. See, e.g., Sherri A. Jayson, Comment, Loving Couple Seeks Woman Age 18–31 To Help
Have Baby. $6500.00 Plus Expenses and a Gift: Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted
Reproductive Technologies by Older Women?, 11 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 287, 329 & n.293
(2001) (noting that “high demand” eggs are “typically” those from educated and tall white
women. Prospective parents and clinics consider the donor’s age; medical and sexual history;
language, analytical, athletic, musical, and artistic ability; S.A.T. score; level of education;
profession; religion; race and ethnic origin; width and length of nose and her degree of
nostril flare; skin tone and tanning ability; hair color and texture; whether she has moles,
freckles and dimples; and if she wore braces as a child); see also The Center for Assisted
Reproduction’s Egg Donor Information website, available at http://www.donoregginfo.com/
html/donors/process.html#evaluation (last visited Dec. 10, 2009). The website explains
the procedure for egg donation, which includes a thorough medical evaluation and the
gathering of “vital statistics about each donor such as ethnicity, height, weight, and eye
color, as well as some information on interests and hobbies.”
125. See, e.g., Divya Subrahmanyam, Ivy League Egg Donor Wanted, Yale Daily News, Apr. 23,
2008, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/24634 (last visited Dec. 10,
2009).
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Much has been written about the inherent race, class, and gender bias in
the oocyte market.126 Some would remedy these problems by standardizing or
capping the prices women receive for their eggs; others would ban payments
for human gametes altogether.127 To date, however, little effort has been made
to rein in the market in human gametes, which proliferates in spite of the
absence of scientific studies establishing the likelihood or the extent to which
an offspring will possess her parents’ non-physical traits. Although scientists
understand the manner in which genetic inheritance controls the manifestation
of single-gene traits, such as eye-color, or single-gene disorders such as Down
syndrome or Huntington’s disease, they are far from understanding how or
whether traits such as intelligence or athletic ability are linked to genetics. At
best, we can hypothesize that the extent to which a particular trait or ability
manifests in a child results from a combination of genetics, environment and
luck.128 Indeed, according to Dr. Dennis Garlick, who analyzed 124 studies of
the underlying basis of intelligence, present scientific thinking suggests that
intelligence is partially created, rather than wholly inherited.129 Specifically, his
review of available research supports a dynamic model, in which intelligence is
not a static trait, inherited at conception, but rather, “…is created when neural
connections in the brain are changed in response to environmental cues.”130
It is this uncertainty about whether genetics matters that raises perhaps
the most interesting questions to be asked about the relationship between
eugenics and assisted reproductive technologies. Consider what we do and
don’t know. We know, for instance, that there are some negative short-term
physical consequences for women who undergo ovarian stimulation in
order to become a “donor.” We do not know very much about the long-term
physical or psychological consequences of “donation.” Although it might
126. Jayson, supra note 124, at 329, n.293 (“White eggs can fetch higher prices than Hispanic
eggs. Because of a scarcity of donors, Jewish eggs are in high demand.”); see also John
A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg
Donation, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1,31 (1989) (arguing that “[f]ears about class bias and
exploitation of the poor seem insufficient to exclude this important source of donor eggs”).
See Kimberly S. Palmer, Get Rid of Bias Against Egg Donors, USA Today, July 29, 1999, at
13A, for a discussion of gender bias in the gamete market regarding society’s perception of
sperm donors versus egg donors, as well as the more stringent qualifications for egg donors
in comparison to sperm donors.
127. See Michelle Oberman, Leslie Wolf & Patti Zettler, Where Stem Cell Research Meets
Abortion Politics: Limits on Buying and Selling Human Oocytes, in Baby Markets: Money
and the New Politics of Creating Families (Michele Goodwin ed., Cambridge University
Press forthcoming 2010), for an overview of the various (rapidly morphing) positions on
selling oocytes.
128. Malinowski, supra note 123.
129. See generally Dennis Garlick, Understanding the Nature of the General Factor of Intelligence:
The Role of Individual Differences in Neural Plasticity as an Explanatory Mechanism, 109
Psychol. Rev. 116 (2002) (presenting the author’s theory of “neural plasticity” to explain
conflicting studies about intelligence, in order to reconcile data suggesting intelligence,
although inherited, is also improved by one’s environment).
130. Id.
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have seemed an obvious inquiry for scientists to pursue, twenty-plus years
after the reproductive endocrinologists began using donor oocytes, evidence
regarding long-term psychological consequences remains mostly anecdotal.131
Likewise, we know little about the consequences for children conceived in this
manner. Early studies suggest higher than average rates of low birth weight,
birth defects, and neurological problems.132 Finally, we know little about the
experiences of parents whose children are conceived using donor gametes.
How do they respond to the traits their child manifests? What happens when
the child they hoped would be a tall, brilliant athlete turns out to be a short
child of below-average abilities?
These uncertainties surely shape the calculus for an individual or a couple
contemplating using assisted reproductive technologies to have a child. The
extent to which the market in human gametes proliferates is testament, then,
to an unspoken faith in the significance of a genetic link. I have seen evidence
of this faith when I’ve asked students to consider which sort of infertility they
think would be harder to endure, the inability to produce gametes, or the
inability to carry a child to term? Invariably, the majority concludes they’d
be more devastated by an inability to have a child who was “genetically their
own” than they would be by the inability to become pregnant themselves.
I don’t judge these students any more than I do prospective parents who
choose to pursue a child with a particular genetic background, be it their own
or one acquired from another. I too would have struggled had I faced similar
choices. No matter how little we actually know about genetics and inheritance,
no matter how ugly the history of eugenics, no matter how much we have
internalized Freud and post-Freudian thinking about how parenting shapes
the life experiences of offspring, I retain an abiding faith that “who” we are is
at least in part a manifestation of our parents’ DNA.
131.

Egg donors, especially those who donate more than once, express the psychological
repercussions they experience in blogs, memoirs, and interviews. Egg donor blogs include
http://eujenics.blogspot.com/ (website no longer available) and http://eggdonor.blogspot.
com/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2009). In recent years, egg donors and their recipients have written
anecdotal books that touch on the psychological impact of egg donation on the donors. See,
e.g., Julia Derek, Confessions of a Serial Egg Donor (Adrenaline Books 2004); Carol Lorbach,
Experiences of Donor Conception: Parents, Offspring, and Donors Through the Years
(Jessica Kingsley Publishers 2003). The physical repercussions of repeated egg donation are
widely known; for example, repeat donors have increased risk for ovarian cancer and long
term hormonal imbalance. See, e.g., Gigi Stone, Egg Donation: Is it Worth the Big Money?,
ABCNews.com, Jan. 11, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/story?id=4121158&page=1 (last
visited Mar. 2, 2009).

132. George Kovalevsky, Paolo Rinaudo & Christos Coutifaris, Do Assisted Reproductive
Technologies Cause Adverse Fetal Outcomes?, 79 Fertility & Sterility 1270 (2003), reprinted
in Judith F. Daar, Reproductive Technologies and the Law 49 (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc. 2006); see also Alastair G. Sutcliffe & Michael Ludwig, Outcome of Assisted
Reproduction, 370 Lancet 351 (2007) (reviewing the scant literature on the impact of these
technologies, in spite of over thirty years experience).
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B. Theme Twelve: Prenatal Testing, Disability, and Eugenics
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, prenatal screening and genetic testing
became a standard part of prenatal care. Health care providers began offering
pregnant women of “advanced maternal age” (those age thirty-five or older) a
series of tests, some invasive, some simply urine screens, designed to identify
genetic abnormalities in their fetuses.133 Indeed, some states began to require all
pregnant women be offered the least expensive of these screens—the maternal
serum alpha-fetoprotein screen.134 These tests were incorporated into standard
practice without much consideration of the impact they would have on the
pregnant woman, her partner, her fetus, and on the population as a whole.
The rapid incorporation of genetic testing into prenatal care seems to
reflect an assumption that it would be an unqualified good to know whether
one’s fetus is genetically abnormal. Indeed, many women apparently view the
tests in this manner, accepting as many as are offered, and terminating their
pregnancies when the tests indicate serious abnormalities.135
At least two significant “eugenic” concerns might be raised about the pace
and the manner in which genetic screens and tests have become the standard
of care in treating pregnant women. First, little attention has been paid to the
information given to women when they consent to be tested and when they
learn the results of their tests.136 Some studies suggest at least some women
might be confused by the fact that their health care provider is offering a
genetic test.137 Nancy Press’s study of California women, for instance, surveyed
pregnant women who self-identified as anti-abortion, and yet, consented to
the alpha-fetal-protein test.138 The fact that they underwent such testing was
puzzling owing to their convictions against terminating pregnancy, and
133. See Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 Am. J.L. & Med. 233,
234–36 (2002) (describing history of prenatal testing in the U.S.).
134. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 6527 (2002):
Clinicians shall provide or cause to be provided to all pregnant women in their care
before the 140th day of gestation, or before the 126th day from conception, as estimated
by medical history or clinical testing, information regarding the use and availability of
prenatal screening for birth defects of the fetus. This information shall be in a format
to be provided or approved by the Department [of Health] and shall be given at the
first prenatal visit and discussed with each pregnant woman.
135. See Suter, supra note 133, at 256–260.
136. Dr. Elena Gates is one of few practitioners who has devoted significant thought to this issue.
See, e.g., Elena Gates, Communicating Risk in Prenatal Genetic Testing, 49 J. Midwifery
Women’s Health 220 (2004).
137.

See Suter, supra note 133, at 256–260 (describing the connection between prenatal testing and
pregnancy termination); see also T.M. Marteau, Towards Informed Decisions about Prenatal
Testing: A Review, 15 Prenat Diagn. 1215 (1995).

138. Nancy Anne Press & Carole H. Browner, Collective Silences, Collective Fictions, in Women
and Prenatal Testing: Facing the Challenges of Genetic Technology 201, 213 (Karen H.
Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., Ohio State Univ. Press 1994).
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indeed, Press found that many of these women consented to the test under the
mistaken impression that it was “good for their fetus,” or “recommended by
their doctors.”139
It is in thinking about what sort of information should be required for a
truly informed consent that one recognizes the complexity posed by these
now-routine tests. Consider, for instance, the information given to a woman
about her options following a “bad” result after amniocentesis. If her test
results indicate that she is carrying a fetus with trisomy 21, or Down syndrome,
what sort of information does she need in order to determine whether to
terminate her pregnancy? Clearly, the circumstances warrant more than merely
a disclosure of the risks of terminating a pregnancy versus carrying a pregnancy
to term. But who determines the quality and quantity of information disclosed
about the implications of trisomy 21 for a child? Will the woman be permitted
to meet parents of children with Down syndrome, or the children themselves?
Would such meetings, or even the suggestion of such meetings, be considered
intrusive and overly paternalistic, smacking, perhaps, of the efforts of antiabortion forces to chill abortion by demanding ultrasounds and speeches
as part of “informed consent” to the procedure? And yet, without such
information, the individual decision to terminate may be based upon little
more than gut level responses to the thought of having a mentally challenged
child.140
At a population level, the eugenic implications of population testing are
more readily apparent. If large numbers of women who undergo testing opt
to terminate their pregnancies, there will be fewer babies born with genetic
abnormalities. Perhaps this fact will benefit society at an economic level.
Indeed, one might worry that there will be discriminatory consequences
for those who elect to carry to term genetically abnormal offspring. These
individuals, such as those born with Down syndrome, tend to generate
higher than average health care costs. But clearly the decision to diminish the
genetic diversity of the human population should be predicated on more than
economics. We cannot know the long-term consequences for our population
of reducing its diversity in this manner, but it seems the ultimate hubris to
assume that, because we cannot be sure it will be harmful, there is no reason
not to proceed in altering the course of our population as a whole.
139. See Press & Browner, supra note 138, at 213; see also Suter, supra note 133, at 256–60.
140. Congress recently passed the Kennedy-Brownback law, which promises a partial solution to
this problem by insuring that women are told the full range of options following prenatal
testing. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Condition Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th
Cong. (2007), Pub. L. No. 110–374 (2008). The law requires families receiving a prenatal or
postnatal diagnosis of Down syndrome (or other congenital condition) be offered current
medical information about life-expectancy, development potential, and quality of life for a
child born with the condition. The bill also provides for the establishment of a registry of
parents willing to adopt children with disabilities.
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Ultimately, the population-based concern collides with concerns about
individual autonomy. Nonetheless, it seems clear that those on all sides of the
abortion issue should agree that those who receive genetic testing should be
provided with the most comprehensive informed consent process.141
C. Theme Thirteen: Disability, Sexuality, and Parenting
The final realm in which I will consider the troubling legacy of eugenics in
contemporary culture lies in the manner in which caretakers, empowered by
the law, respond to issues of sexuality and reproduction among the mentally
disabled. In the Epilogue to his book, Lombardo reviews contemporary
practices governing the sterilization of mentally disabled individuals. He
concludes that current legal safeguards make it improbable, although not
impossible, for government officials to embark upon the sort of broad-scaled
sterilization campaigns seen in the early 20th century.
Lombardo observes that current sterilization laws apply to “incompetents,”
such as the mentally ill or mentally retarded.142 These laws run the gamut from
highly protective of an individual’s due process rights to a startling Arkansas
law that requires no judicial review before sterilization.143 Lombardo questions
the state laws that allow parents or legal guardians of the mentally disabled
to request “voluntary” sterilizations of their family members or wards.144 He
finds troubling the “extent to which this practice may reflect the same attitudes
played out in the Buck case—that the disabled are worthy of contempt and
that the social costs such people generate justify court orders for unwanted
surgery.”145
Although the ongoing practice of permitting the state to order the
sterilization of mentally disabled individuals may be seen as a reflection
of conventional eugenic notions, it also is the product of a broader set of
legal, medical, ethical, and pragmatic concerns. Decisions surrounding sex,
pregnancy, and parenting by mentally disabled individuals are complex,
and trigger a variety of concerns on the part of their caretakers. Parents, the
most common caretakers for mentally disabled adult children, may express
a desire to control or limit their child’s sexual activity for reasons ranging
141. See Mary B. Mahowald, Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine:
Aren’t We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul Lombardo’s “Taking Eugenics Seriously,”
30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 219 (2003), for a thoughtful consideration of this issue. See also Note,
Regulating Eugenics, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1578 (2008).
142. Lombardo, supra note 1, at 267.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 268.
145. Id.
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from personal discomfort with the prospect of their child becoming a sexual
being,146 to concerns about their child’s capacity to consent to sex, to fear that
their child will be unable to raise a child on their own.147
There is a wide range of abilities among individuals who might be termed
“mentally disabled.”148 In the realm of sexual contact, the relevant legal issues
turn on the extent to which an individual is deemed “competent.” The legal
definition of competence is vague, though, and the reality is that one might
be competent for some purposes, but not for others. One must begin thinking
about competence among the mentally disabled by considering the extent
to which the individual is capable of consenting to sexual contact.149 This
is necessary because an individual who is competent may make their own
decisions about sexual activity and reproduction; if they are incompetent,
however, then sexual activity with them is a crime.150

146. See, e.g., S. Matthew Liao, Julian Savulescu & Mark Sheeha, The Ashley Treatment: Best
Interests, Convenience, and Parental Decision-making, 37 The Hastings Center Report
16 (2007) (discussing a case involving hormonal treatment administered to prevent the
biological maturation of a profoundly physically and developmentally disabled adolescent).
147. Elizabeth J. Reed, Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to
Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 Va. L. Rev. 799, 806–07 (1999).
148. Id. at 801–02.
149. See Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 315,
341–55 (1997), for an enlightening and thorough discussion of this issue. Professor Denno
catalogues state legislative standards for determining when a mentally retarded individual
may legally consent to sex. She criticizes the laws for creating overly paternalistic standards
of consent meant to criminalize sex with mentally disabled women, in particular, thus
denying their sexual autonomy. She also criticizes state laws for providing vague consent
tests, but no guidance for judges on how to apply the tests.
150. Indeed, one of the problems with the sterilization of mentally incompetent individuals,
particularly those at high risk of sexual abuse such as those who are institutionalized, is that
in so doing, one may mask the evidence of rape, making it more difficult to prosecute sexual
predators who prey on this population.
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Sexual activity occurs among the mentally disabled regardless of their
capacity to consent.151 At the same time, research suggests that these individuals
are disproportionally vulnerable to manipulation and coercion152 and are more
likely than the general population to experience sexual assault, although they
might not identify it as such.153
Sexual activity among mentally disabled individuals also triggers concerns
that compel the involvement, at least at a preliminary level, of medical and
legal professionals. Medical experts must evaluate the individual’s capacity to
consent to sex and to make informed decisions regarding contraception and
pregnancy. They must further evaluate the individual’s capacity to consent to
sterilization, or to make sound decisions regarding prenatal care or abortion.
In the event that an individual is incompetent to make these decisions, the law
must identify a surrogate decision-maker, appointed to render decisions on
that individual’s behalf.
Ostensibly, the job of the surrogate decision-maker is to render the decision
the individual would have made, were she competent to do so herself. Of
course, this task becomes nonsensical when applied to a person who never was
competent to begin with.154 In such cases, the decision-maker’s task becomes
“objective,” and requires determining the course of action deemed to be in the
ward’s best interests. This process is so established in the medical context of
decision-making for a host of incompetent patients that one seldom pauses
to question the extent to which one person can ever determine another’s real
best interests. That some families choose to sterilize a disabled relative for
eugenic or self-interested reasons does not mean all families will do so; as
Lombardo observes, families often request sterilization of a disabled relative
for the noblest of intentions.155 In the realm of sexuality and reproduction for
the mentally disabled, for instance, is it in the individual’s best interests to
151.

See Denno, supra n. 149, at 338, n.137, citing Rosalyn Kramer Monat, Sexuality and the
Mentally Retarded: A Clinical and Therapeutic Guidebook 58–59 (College Hill Press
1982). See generally Elizabeth Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive
Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 Duke L.J. 806 (1986).

152. The National Association for Retarded Citizens statistics regarding rates of sexual assault
among mentally disabled individuals show that they are more vulnerable to assault. For
example, a 2000 Nebraska study found mentally disabled children were four times more
likely to be sexually abused than were non-mentally disabled children. Leigh Ann Davis,
The ARC Q&A: People with Intellectual Disabilities and Sexual Violence, www.thearc.org,
August 2005, http://www.thearc.org/NetCommunity/Document.Doc?&id=155 (last visited
Dec. 10, 2009).
153. A tragic and famous example is the 1989 “Glen Ridge assault,” in which a group of teenage
boys lured a mildly retarded teenage girl into a basement where they asked her to perform
sexual acts and inserted objects into her vagina. In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637 (1991). The girl did
not know what rape was and complied with the boys’ requests; she later told a swim teacher
about the incident only to ask how to say “no” to such requests in the future. In re B.G., 589
A.2d at 640.
154. Superintendent of Belchertown State School & another v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
155. Lombardo, supra note 1, at 268.
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experience sexuality? To experience pregnancy? To be able to hold her own
baby, even if she lacks the skills to raise it on her own? Further complicating
the decision-maker’s task is the reality that a family member asked to perform
the job of surrogate decision-maker may be conflicted about the extent to
which her decision regarding her ward has consequences for her own life.
Such consequences, Lombardo points out, should not be dismissed lightly, yet
neither should they be exclusively dispositive in authorizing the sterilization
of the mentally infirm.156
In addition to these practical and moral concerns, there is reason to believe
that eugenics still informs (or misinforms) decisions regarding whether a
mentally disabled individual ought to be sterilized, or to undergo an abortion.
Although it is evident that some developmental delays and disabilities are
genetically transmitted, there is ample evidence demonstrating that parents
with severe disabilities can produce healthy, normal children.157 Furthermore,
even if it were the case that all disabled parents produced similarly disabled
offspring, it is not necessarily self-evident that this result is a tragedy to be
avoided. One of the most persistent and perhaps most insidious forms of
eugenic-based thinking in contemporary society is the tacit assumption, most
often seen in prenatal diagnostic testing, that it is better to avoid the birth
of disabled individuals than to welcome and accommodate them. I do not
mean to suggest that pregnant women should be denied access to prenatal
diagnostics, but rather that these tests should not absolve society of the duty
to make life easier for disabled individuals and their families.
III. Conclusion
There lies a profound sadness at the core of Lombardo’s history of the
U.S. government’s involvement with and support of sterilization. The story
he recounts for us is not simply about lawyers, doctors, and policy-makers
who collaborated in a misguided effort to promote their vision of progress.
It is also about the emotional significance and the value we place upon one’s
capacity to reproduce. Lombardo’s work helps us to recognize something that
should long have been obvious: policies governing reproduction, whether
direct or indirect, reflect tacit assumptions about the value the state places on
156. Id.
157.

Even a quick internet search reveals ample evidence of parenting of normal children by disabled
parents. See, e.g., http://www.disabledparents.net (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). Likewise, not all
apparently non-disabled parents will have non-disabled offspring. For example, contrast
two relatively common genetically-linked forms of mental retardation: Fragile X syndrome
and Down syndrome. Whereas Fragile X syndrome typically is passed from an unaffected
mother to her male offspring, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/fragilexsyndrome.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2009), current evidence suggests that most cases of Down syndrome are
not inherited, but instead, are caused by abnormalities in cell-replication occurring early in
fetal development, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition=downsyndrome (last visited Mar. 2,
2009).
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the importance of bearing children. More to the point, these various policies
demonstrate an enduring sense that, when it comes to the right to enjoy
parenthood, some people are more deserving than others.
The words we use to describe the condition of being unable to reproduce
seem far too shallow to convey the longing and despair experienced by those
who want to have children but who are physically incapable of reproduction.
We do not call it “sterility” anymore; one seldom hears someone say: “I am
sterile.” Instead, we have optimistically recast it as a medical condition,
infertility, which suggests the possibility of treatment and cure, at least for
those who can afford it. The truth is, though, that for those who want children
but for whatever reason cannot have them, the harsh word “sterile” may come
closer to capturing the emotional valence of their reality.
Lombardo forces us to look straight on at Carrie Buck’s grief, and at the grief
of countless others who were stripped of their right to reproduce. One cannot
but feel ashamed and sickened by the governments that stood in judgment
of these individuals and denied them access to what many consider to be one
of the most central and transformative of human experiences. It is easy to
condemn their actions. But beyond the most obvious cases of governmental
abuse of authority lie harder questions about the extent to which there is a
fundamental right to be a parent, and whether, if such a right exists, it constricts
a government’s ability to make policies that limit its citizens’ free exercise of
that right, or indeed, generates affirmative obligations upon a government to
assist its citizens in pursuing that right.

